The p efi post has o e o e a o o u e sp eadi g f o philosoph to the political scene of globalization. It signals the overthrow of West-originated certainties that have long been used to explain and govern the world.
With the devastating crisis that hit most of the wealthy countries 1 and the failure of the financial systems, we entered a new era, characterized by both conjunctural and structural changes. It entails a profound transformation that affects the perception and the distribution of power. Could this mean the end of the so-called Washington Consensus?
What is the Washington Consensus?
The te Washi gto Co se sus comes from a simple set of ten recommendations identified by economist John Williamson in 1989: 1) fiscal discipline; 2) redirecting public expenditure; 3) tax reform; 4) financial liberalization; 5) adoption of a single, competitive * Article published in RCCS 94 (September 2011). Thanks are due to Elena Proden and Adriana Jacinto for their help in preparing this text. A different version of this article was published in English in Géopolitique Africaine, , ith the title Is There a post-Washi gto Co se sus? 1 In this text, the term wealthy countries refers essentially to G7 members and the European Union. Other methods of measuring economic wealth would undoubtedly produce a different list, but in common speech the term is still associated with the abovementioned group of countries. exchange rate; 6) trade liberalization; 7) elimination of barriers to foreign direct investment; 8) privatization of state owned enterprises; 9) deregulation of market entry and competition; and se u e p ope t ights. The efe e e to o se sus ea t that this list was premised on the ideas shared at the time by power circles in Washington, including the US Congress and Administration, on the one hand, and international institutions such as the Washington-based IMF and the World Bank, on the other, supported by a range of think tanks and influential economists.
It is important to note here that the theoretical foundations underlying these policy recommendations were nothing else but neoclassical economics espousing a firm belief in the a ket s i isi le ha d, the ratio alit of e o o i a to s hoi e, a d a minimalistic isio of the states egulatio of e o o ies. The ad e t of this e pa adig has also marked the retreat of development economics as a distinct field, which had been long do i ated the Depe de " hool a d othe theo ies Nai , , ofte i sha p contrast with neoclassical economics and methodological individualism. It was development economics that had often guided policies experimented with in developing countries before the Washington Consensus era. Most independent African governments, for example, sought to promote industrialization, in an effort to develop local production and reduce imports, promote employment, raise the standard of living, and break out of the vicious circle of trade patterns epitomized in the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis (unfavorable terms of trade for commodity-exporting and manufacturer-importing ou t ies . The Washi gto Co se sus e ipes, o t ast, e e p ese ted as u i e sal, similarly applicable in the context of developed and developing countries, even if they ended up being implemented in a discriminatory and uneven fashion.
Washington Consensus policies were applied for more than two decades in such diverse contexts as Africa, Latin America and Asia, as well as in countries emerging from real socialism in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. There were usually two major stages of intervention: the first focused on macroeconomic stability and structural adjustment programs, and the second included such objectives as improving institutions, reducing corruption or dealing with infrastructure inefficiency (Naim, 1999) . The conditionality exercised by the Bretton Woods institutions and wealthy countries played a crucial role in i de ted ou t ies de isions to push through macroeconomic stabilization reforms and structural adjustment programs. The debt crisis that first affected a number of Latin American countries and then African and Asian countries, in the 1970s and 1980s, further increased their dependence on external loans, leaving them no other option than to follow the prescriptions that enabled them to access financing.
What Exactly Went Wrong?
Washington Consensus policies have been criticized since the 1990s by a significant number of leading economists. Most notably, Joseph Stiglitz, chief economist at the World Bank from 1997 to 2000, criticized the policies prescribed by the IMF in response to the financial crises in Russia and Asia (Stiglitz, 2003) ; Paul Krugman was in favor of Asian governments imposing controls on capital flows in 1997-98. The debate generated over the response to the crisis provided a good illustration of the deep divide between leading economists, who either supported or opposed the IMF. The Washington Consensus purists insisted on the importance of stabilizing exchange rates in times of crisis through public budget cuts, higher taxes and interest rates and other recessive measures. Their opponents criticized such policies, arguing that they would lead to recession (Naim, 1999) .
Stiglitz called attention to the fact that sharp increases in interest rates would contribute towards the deepening of the crisis (Stiglitz, 2003) .
It is now commonplace to say that structural adjustment (SAP) and macroeconomic stabilization programs had a disastrous impact on social policies and poverty levels in many countries. Following the first wave of reforms undertaken by debt-affected African and Latin American countries -which included public expenditure cuts, introduction of charges for health and education, and reductions in industrial protection, leading to high unemployment, poverty rise and unequal income distribution -UNICEF published the report Adjustment with a Human Face (1987) , which called for eso-poli ies to be redirected towards protecting social and economic sectors that were essential to the survival of the poor, through the introduction of social protection programs. Others argued that export crops contributed to indebtedness, or that adjustment programs exacerbated unequal land distribution, promising that effi ie t la d a kets would replace traditional tenure systems, while encouraging deindustrialization through wholesale privatization and unfettered markets (Sahn, Dorosh & Younger, 1997: 1-6 ).
One of the major drawbacks of the policies imposed by the IMF and the World Bank was the lack of technical expertise and strategic capability on the part of the implementing countries. A structurally unequal donor-recipient relationship was established, in part due to the weakening of the public sector induced by the drastic reduction of the administrative machine. The fast and uncontrolled liberalization of small African economies presented additional dangers, such as the high volatility of capital flows, but a larger problem for African economies is that their growth potential is directly affected by their ability to export and use export revenue to diversify production. Their ability to do so is constrained by a global trade regime inimical to the full develop e t of Af i a ou t ies comparative advantage. Limited market access for low-cost textiles, cotton, and agricultural products and competition from heavily subsidized industrial economy exports effectively prevent growth. (Manuel, 2003: 18) The social impact of these reforms was devastating for Sub-Saharan Africa. Many economists recognized that the difficulties associated with the promotion of economic stability and liberalization had a disproportionate impact on the poor, leading to greater poverty and unequal income distribution. International financial institutions, particularly the World Bank, displayed great intellectual arrogance in failing to acknowledge for a long time the vastly negative impact of such policies, denying the criticisms leveled at them, and limiting their response to launching compensatory programs (Sahn, Dorosh & Younger, 1997: 6) .
It is thus not surprising that macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment policies prompted a wave of popular unrest that contributed to the recrudescence of many civil wars in the 1990s. The 1997 Asian crisis also raised some important questions about the consequences of the deregulation of financial markets and demonstrated the limits of Washington-based policy thought.
The Structural Consequences of the Washington Consensus
The rapid economic growth registered in many regions of the South in the first decade of the 21 st century, accompanied by expanding trade and investment, offset the worries of the financial markets, which ignored the signs of the impending storm. In 2008, however, the crème de la crème of the economist profession, as well as the governments of rich countries, finally had to face the inconvenient truth about the imperfection of markets.
Massive and uncontrolled financial speculation has produced the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression, sudde l e eali g a u e of st u tu al diseases that the Washington Consensus had been hiding under the rug.
The global downturn was revealing in two major respects. First, the domination of the financial sector over the real economy had led to the creation of bubbles, to unpredictability for the future of economies, and increased vulnerability of populations, simultaneously increasing unequal income distribution and the gap between rich and poor. Second, it called into question the prevailing economic theories that served as a basis for formulating and prescribing policies, including those formulated by BrettonWoods institutions at global level, in particular structural adjustment programs.
In reality, after three decades of Washington Consensus, we have been witnessing a confluence of crises including spikes in food and energy prices as well as financial and There is now more awareness of growing inequalities and the scandalous concentration of income -with the richest 20% getting 82.7% of the global income (Lopes, Sachs & Dowbor, 2010: 5) . The dramatic rise in the share of poor people living in so-called emerging countries reveals how unequal income distribution is becoming, even in rapidly growing economies: 72% of the poor worldwide currently live in middle income countries, whereas two decades ago 93% lived in low income countries (Sumner, 2011 ). In the current structure of power, economic growth, even when generated by technological innovation, benefits the financial intermediaries that pursue short-term maximization of profits rather than the engineers of the process (Lopes, Sachs & Dowbor, 2010: 5) .
Productive inclusion as reflected in the formal sector is the exception rather than the rule. Production and consumption patterns reveal an abnormal deformation of priorities, where military budgets and luxury consumer goods dominate over access to basic services, education and health:
The planet produces almost a kilo of grain per day per inhabitant and we have more than one billion people going hungry. The ten million children who die of hunger, no access to clean water and other absurd causes constitutes an unbearable scandal. But from the private investment point of view, solving essential problems generates no profits, and the orientation of our production capacity is radically deformed. (Lopes, Sachs & Dowbor, 2010: 7) These systemic failures are principally due to a skewed configuration of production processes, false structures of incentives, and an economic framework that externalizes  Third, the strong belief that wealthy countries would never be affected by crises, something that justified discriminatory practices in terms of surveillance before 2008 (IEO, 2011) and the application of double standards during the crisis. Thus, the financial crisis that resulted from spiraling deregulation did not come as a complete surprise.
Concerning the last point, we need only compare the IMF response to the current European crisis with the policies it implemented in the 1980s and 1990s to have an idea of those double standards. Although there has been a laudable change of attitude, favoring the so ial di e sio i stead of edito s i te ests, the fa t is that these poli ies a e o l being promoted now, in Europe, hypocritically erasing the past. What is there to say of facts such as these: the total African external debt was $324.7 billion USD in 2010, meaning 20.7% of GDP, while the public debt of the United States was $14.5 trillion USD in the same year, or 98.6% of GDP?
How Did Science Become Ideology?
The ostensible belief in recipes that do t o k a d yet continue to be used is somewhat of a paradox. When theoretical tools designed to help comprehend reality are used without regard to their limitations, or when findings are selectively adjusted to endorse one single view premised on wishful thinking, then science becomes ideology. and what we want to see is too easy to cross. A othe i po ta t easo fo the IMF s failure to report accurately and produce honest analysis was the influence of the largest shareholders on surveillance and policies (IEO, 2011: 20) .
The IEO d e a u flatte i g pi tu e of the IMF staff, poi ti g to og iti e iases, including a homogeneous mindset (groupthink a d a i sula ultu e that rarely referred to external research; the belief that economists in advanced countries were
better aware of what was happening in their own countries, overlooking the importance of financial issues and the analysis of macroeconomic linkages; overreliance on models and similar tools, such as macro modeling, which practically did not include the analysis of money and asset markets; overreliance on simplistic and first-round examination techniques, such as stress testing, to determine the soundness of banking systems; and worst still, misinterpretation or dismissal of certain data for the sake of theoretical coherence (IEO, 2011: 17-19 ).
Intellectual honesty was further injured by the lack of reference to the limitations of data or to the existence of different analyses. The IMF epitomized the major drawbacks of modern knowledge production and applied research, characterized by sectoral approaches and lack of holistic analysis. More specifically, it opted for economic theories, quantitative and data selection methods that sustained the coherence of its neoclassical assumptions.
Dissenting views were silenced given the power chain reaction between the largest shareholder countries and senior management. The authors of the evaluation report also noted the complaints about lack of even-handedness in the treatment of different countries (IEO, 2011: 20) . To put it in a nutshell, the main institution in charge of macroeconomic policy recommendations produced an analysis that was heavily influenced by its most powerful members, and promoted conformity, self-censorship, data selectivity, and one set of analytical approaches implemented in a discriminatory manner.
It is essential to engage in an honest academic dialogue and to promote intelligent 
Significant Changes in Africa and Its Role
The sets of indicators we select for our analysis and the way we collect, define and interpret data are important. The divergence between the Washington-based institutions, on the one hand, and the United Nations, on the other, in the 1990s with regard to the impact of structural adjustment reforms provides a compelling example of different recommendations based on different approaches.
The growing influence of the South, including African countries, is a factor that is going to contribute to change on many levels. At present, we cannot afford to ignore divergences, since the major players and power relations are rapidly changing dominant in Sub-Saharan Africa, argues that the best way to confront the convergence of the food and energy crises and global economic depression is to promote industry. Economic diversification and structural transformation, involving a shift from low to high productivity activities, are expected to i ease Af i a s esista e to e te al impacts.
Industrialization, improved labor productivity in agriculture and developments in the service sector are factors that can help meet the challenges of job creation for the millions of young African people entering the labor market each year (UNCTAD, 2011: 3-4) . In fact, industrialization is an integral part of the national development programs of South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria and Uganda (Altenburg, 2011) .
Some experts believe that the development of agribusiness provides an opportunity for improving the standard of living of poor populations. Currently, African agriculture has a low rate of capitalization, mechanization and added value. The value of agribusiness production in Sub-"aha a Af i a is fou ti es lo e tha B azil s, a d the ag i ultu al share of GDP in Africa exceeds that of agribusiness by 10%. As a result, less than 30% of agricultural produce is processed in Africa, as compared with 98% in high-income countries. African countries generate only $40 USD for processing 1 ton of agricultural produce, i.e. 4.5 times less than high-income countries (Korwama, 2011).
The emphasis placed on agriculture has become not only a solution for the problem of hunger, but also an attractive road to development in a period of high food prices, potentially inverting the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. In contrast to meso level policies, some development experts have shown a renewed interest in developing so-called inclusive businesses, whose activities are market based but geared towards generating social benefits by involving beneficiaries as suppliers and customers. A recent study by the Monitor Group identified at least 439 enterprises of this kind in nine countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Monitor Group, 2010: 3-4) .
Even the World Bank has shifted from a pessimistic stance to a generalized euphoria over the future of the continent:
Sub-"aha a Af i a […] i has a u p e ede ted oppo tu it fo t a sfo atio and sustai ed g o th.
[…] Putti g these fa to s togethe , the Ba k o ludes that Af i a ould e on the brink of an economic take-off, much like China was 30 years ago, and India 20 years ago. (The World Bank, 2011: 3-4) The Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Washington Consensus
The reconfiguration of economic geography started exerting pressure on the old and inadequate governance structures of the IMF and World Bank established after the Second World War. As a result, they began a slow process of reform that included the redistribution of voting shares. First, the voting share of Sub-Saharan Africa rose by 3%, but continues to represent only 1.4% of the total. After a second round of revisions, Chi a s al ulated uota sha e ose f o 6,38 to 7.47%, which placed it ahead of Japan (whose calculated quota declined to 6,99%), but still behind the United States, with 17.8%. The major world creditors are now countries of the South, many of which achieved success through policies that challenged the orthodoxy of the Washington Consensus. The IMF s Chief E o o ist, Oli ie Bla ha d, e og ized that i the age-old discussion of the relative roles of markets and the state, the pendulum has swung -at least a bit -toward the state, and that disto tio s ithin finance are macro-relevant Bla ha d, ). This implies a humble stance but not necessarily a fundamental change.
I deed, the IMF s e e t sta e o the Eu opea de t isis as at ti es su p isi g fo those used to the old style Washington Consensus. In Ireland, the IMF first appeared as defending the interests of the Irish taxpayers in the face of the European Central Bank and I ela d s edito s putti g fo a d a pla to edu e € illion of unguaranteed bonds by two-thirds o a e age (Whitney, 2011). It later changed to a more traditional role as the Euro area crisis deepened and creditors began to exert pressure. In any case, the macroeconomic policies promoted by some Southeast Asian countries as well as Latin A e i a s fiscal conservatism coupled with aggressive social policies (through income transfer programs) have placed the Washington Consensus on the defensive.
The Post-Washington Consensus Era: New Hope for Economists?
While neoclassical theories are undergoing close scrutiny, economists need to remember how Keynes challenged the perfection of markets, particularly financial markets, making the case for regulation.
The return of the State onto the scene to correct market failures is inevitable. Ha-Joon
Cha g e a ks that i dust ial poli is o spi uous its a se e, e i di g us of the export-o ie ted i dust ial poli e pe ie e of "outh Ko ea: sustainable export success over a long period of time, for which the country is justly famous, requires protection and u tu i g of i fa t i dust ies th ough sele ti e i dust ial poli , athe tha f ee t ade Raghuram 'aja , the the IMF s Chief E o o ist, a ed a out the real possibility of a financial collapse as a result of taking risks that, most of the time, offer generous compensation, but involve a low probability of severe negative effects. However, the crucial issue was whether banks would be able to provide liquidity to financial markets.
Based on fi a ial a to s atio alit , 'aja poi ted to the incentive structure of the financial sector that encouraged this kind of risk ( Finally, Olivier Blanchard himself acknowledges the relevance of behavioral economics and behavioral finance, as well as agency theory, when he discusses the workings and incentives of the financial sector (Blanchard, 2011) .
After a long period of Washington Consensus orthodoxy, the blossoming of alternatives and the variety of approaches are refreshing, all the more so since many of their p opo e ts a e pa t of the s ste , so to speak. It ea s that e e the do i a t s hools of economic thought are ready to start revising their views. Alternative currents, including evolutionary, institutional, and neostructuralist economics, have resurfaced. We are living in exciting times marked by the demise of the ideology that has guided Western policymakers and was imposed on the rest of the world for nearly three decades. In truth, the confluence of the rise of the South and the decline of the political and ideological supremacy of the West is not accidental. In our current globalized world, the critiques of a prevailing ideology in particular -derived from post-colonial theories -may be finally expected to emerge from the theoretical isolation of philosophical cultural studies into the open field of political economy.
The unlocking of economic theory and the questioning of disciplinary divisions represent a window of opportunity for reinvigorating an integrated and ambitious sustainable development agenda. The concept of development should be reconsidered through a holistic approach, encapsulating intrinsically linked economic, social and environmental dimensions, instead of breaking them up into separate compartments. A stronger and more democratic state, supported by efficient governance mechanisms, should assume this role. This is particularly important if public policies are to provide better social protection.
Knowledge should become public in order to promote collective and global creation.
The potential of emerging urban centers could also be used for fostering integrated regional development and planning, as well as endogenous participatory decision-making processes (Lopes, Sachs & Dowbor, 2010) .
The first practical steps for the actual replacement of the Washington Consensus should focus on recovering the regulatory capacity of the state, aligning national accounting systems to value intangibles, including the incorporation of externalities and the introduction of innovative indicators, guaranteeing basic income, rationalizing financial systems of intermediation, redesigning tax systems, adopting budgets that aim at improving the redistribution of resources according to economic, social and environmental results, and taxing and registering speculative transactions (Lopes, Sachs & Dowbor, 2010) .
A brave new world is unfolding before us.
